

CIA/OCI/BRIEF 169-75
3 NOVEMBER 1975

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TO: EUROPEAN BRIEF 169-75.4

1. SPAIN: THE SPANISH COMMUNIST PARTY HAS APPARENTLY MADE SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS IN ITS BID TO CREATE A FACADE OF UNITY BETWEEN THE TWO LOOSE COALITIONS OF THE LEFT.4

THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED SATURDAY BY THE COMMUNIST-DOMINATED DEMOCRATIC JUNTA AND THE MORE MODERATELY LEFTIST DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM OF CONVERGENCE WOULD NOT CONDEMN PRINCE JUAN CARLOS WITHOUT A TRIAL. THE COMMUNIQUE WAS CAREFULLY VAGUE ON THE CRUCIAL POINT OF COMMUNIST DEMANDS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THE CALLING OF A NATIONAL REFERENDUM TO CHOOSE BETWEEN MONARCHY AND REPUBLIC. THE STATEMENT ISSUED THIS WEEKEND CALLED FOR A "DEMOCRATIC BREAK" WITH FRANCOISM AND REFERRED GENERALLY TO A "CONSTITUENT PERIOD" WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A REFERENDUM. NO DEADLINE WAS SET FOR THE REFERENDUM.4

THE OTHER THREE MAIN "OBJECTIVES" LISTED IN THE COMMUNIQUE WERE: AMNESTY FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS; FREEDOM FOR LABOR UNIONS AND POLITICAL PARTIES AND GUARANTEES OF HUMAN RIGHTS; AND FULL POLITICAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS FOR REGIONS SUCH AS CATALONIA AND THE BASQUE

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COUNTRY. THESE ARE ALL ISSUES ON WHICH THERE IS BROAD AGREEMENT IN THE SPANISH OPPOSITION. SIGNIFICANTLY, THE COMMUNIQUE CLOSED WITH THE STATEMENT THAT THE TWO COALITIONS, WHILE REMAINING IN CONTACT AND COOPERATING FROM TIME TO TIME, WILL CONTINUE TO SEARCH FOR THEIR OWN PARTICULAR OBJECTIVES. 4

THE COMMUNISTS' IMMEDIATE AIM PROBABLY IS TO HEAD OFF ANY ATTEMPT BY PRINCE JUAN CARLOS AND HIS NEW GOVERNMENT TO ISOLATE THEM FROM THE NON-COMMUNIST LEFT. JUAN CARLOS MIGHT SEEK, FOR EXAMPLE, TO LEGALIZE THE LEFT-OF-CENTER CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC AND SOCIALIST PARTIES, WHICH MAKE UP THE BULK OF THE DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM. LEGALIZATION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY IN THE NEAR FUTURE, BUT IT MAY BECOME A CENTRAL ISSUE DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD. 4

MANY OF THE ILLEGAL OPPOSITIONIST PARTIES CONTINUE TO DISTRUST THE COMMUNISTS. THEY CANNOT AFFORD TO OPPOSE LEGALIZATION OF THE PARTY, HOWEVER, FOR TO DO SO WOULD OPEN THEM TO CHARGES THAT THEY HAD SOLD OUT TO THE REGIME. THEY ALSO FEEL THAT THE STATUS OF ILLEGALITY FAVORS THE COMMUNISTS, AND THAT THE PARTY'S WEAKNESSES CAN

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BE EXPOSED ONLY IF IT IS BROUGHT INTO THE OPEN POLITICAL ARENA.

{SECRET}4

2. PORTUGAL: LEFTIST FORCES IN PORTUGAL ARE CITING THE ARREST ~~11~~ LAST WEEKEND OF TWO SUPPORTERS OF FORMER PRESIDENT SPINOLA TO JUSTIFY THEIR CLAIMS THAT A RIGHT-WING COUP IS IMMINENT.4

THE TWO FORMER MILITARY OFFICERS, WHO REPORTEDLY LEFT THE COUNTRY WITH SPINOLA FOLLOWING THE ABORTIVE COUP OF MARCH 11, WERE PICKED UP BY SECURITY TROOPS AT A CAMP FOR ANGOLAN REFUGEES IN NORTHERN PORTUGAL. THEY WERE SAID TO HAVE ENTERED PORTUGAL SECRETLY FROM SPAIN. SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS WITH TIES TO THE ~~CONSERVATIVE~~ CONSERVATIVE PORTUGUESE LIBERATION ARMY MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN DETAINED.4

ANTI-COMMUNIST MILITARY LEADERS, INCLUDING PRIME MINISTER AZEVEDO, ARE APPEALING FOR CALM AND UNITY TO COOL THE UNREST STIRRED BY ANTICIPATION OF ANGOLAN INDEPENDENCE NEXT WEEK. AN ARMY SPOKESMAN ON SUNDAY DENIED LEFTIST-INSPIRED REPORTS THAT LIVE-FIRE MANEUVERS ARE SCHEDULED FOR THIS WEEK. HE LABELED THE STORY "ALARMIST" AND SAID SUCH DRILLS COULD ONLY LEAD TO A COUP ATTEMPT FROM THE RIGHT.4

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GENERAL CHARAIS, COMMANDER OF THE CENTRAL MILITARY REGION, WARNED THE LEFT IN AN INTERVIEW LAST WEEK THAT ANY ATTEMPT ON ITS PART TO OVERTHROW THE AZEVEDO GOVERNMENT AND TURN ANGOLA OVER TO THE SOVIET-BACKED POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA WOULD SPAWN A RIGHT-WING POWER PLAY. CHARAIS BELIEVES THAT THE LEFT HAS ALIENTATED A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THE POPULATION, CREATING THE CONDITIONS FOR A SUCCESSFUL RESURGENCE BY THE RIGHT.4

THE LEFT HAS BEEN AGITATING TO ABANDON LISBON'S DECLARED POLICY OF IMPARTIALITY AMONG THE THREE ANGOLA LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND TO SUPPORT THE POPULAR MOVEMENT, BUT THE AZEVEDO GOVERNMENT DOES NOT APPEAR LIKELY TO CHANGE ITS NEUTRAL POSTURE AND FURTHER ANTAGONIZE EITHER THE LEFT OR THE RIGHT. IN ADDITION TO INTERNAL PRESSURES FROM LEFT-WING POLITICAL PARTIES, THE PRESS ORGANS THEY CONTROL, AND SYMPATHETIC RADICAL MILITARY OFFICERS, POPULAR MOVEMENT ACTIVISTS ARE ARRIVING IN LISBON ON REFUGEE FLIGHTS TO TAKE PART IN RALLIES SUPPORTING THE POPULAR MOVEMENT. THE FIRST IS SCHEDULED FOR MONDAY NIGHT.4

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AS THE AIRLIFT OF REFUGEES FROM ANGOLA COMES TO AN END, CONSERVATIVE REFUGEE GROUPS ARE CERTAIN TO BECOME BOLDER IN REGISTERING THEIR DISCONTENT WITH LEFT-WING SUPPORT FOR THE POPULAR MOVEMENT AS WELL AS INSUFFICIENT RESETTLEMENT ASSISTANCE FROM THE LISBON GOVERNMENT. THE BOMBING AND SACKING LATE LAST MONTH OF AN ANGOLAN CULTURAL CENTER CONTROLLED BY THE POPULAR MOVEMENT SUGGESTS THAT THE RETURNEES DO NOT INTEND TO SHY AWAY FROM VIOLENCE. TO COUNTER THE LEFT-WING EFFORTS, THEY HAVE PLANNED A DEMONSTRATION AGAINST THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR LATER IN THE WEEK.4

DESPITE THE POLITICAL TURMOIL, THE 19-MAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL IS ATTEMPTING TO CARRY OUT BUSINESS AS USUAL. THE COUNCIL DID NOT, AS RUMORED, TAKE ACTION AGAINST ARMY CHIEF FABIAO OR SECURITY HEAD CARVALHO AT ITS SESSION LAST WEEKEND. IT DID, HOWEVER, APPROVE THE LONG-AWAITED LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL OF NEARLY 1,300 MEMBERS OF THE FORMER REGIME'S SECURITY POLICE, WHO HAVE BEEN DETAINED WITHOUT CHARGES SINCE THE APRIL 1974 COUP. THE COUNCIL ALSO SET UP A TRIBUNAL TO DEAL WITH PERSONS IMPLICATED IN THE MARCH 11 COUP ATTEMPT AND ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTION TO ARREST CIVILIANS

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POSSESSING MILITARY ARMS.4

THE ANTI-COMMUNIST MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL MAY HAVE DECIDED TO DELAY PLANS AGAINST FABIAO AND CARVALHO BECAUSE OF THE CONCERTED CAMPAIGN BY LEFT-WING MILITARY AND CIVILIAN GROUPS TO EQUATE THEIR REMOVAL WITH RIGHTIST PLOTS TO TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENT. ANOTHER LIKELY OBSTACLE TO THE ANTI-COMMUNISTS IS PRESIDENT COSTA GOMES, WHO HAS SERVED AS THE MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCK IN PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO OUST RADICAL OFFICERS FROM HIGH POSITIONS. {SECRET}4

3. ROMAINA: ROMANIAN PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU CLEARLY USED HIS FOUR-DAY OFFICIAL VISIT TO LISBON TO SHOW BUCHAREST'S DETERMINATION TO PURSUE ITS OWN INTERPRETATION OF COMMUNIST DOCTRINE.4

CEAUSESCU PRESSED FOR CLOSER ROMANIAN-PORTUGUESE TIES BOTH TO INCREASE HIS INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE AND TO TRY TO HEAD OFF A RADICAL SWING TO THE LEFT THAT COULD BRING PORTUGAL UNDER CONSIDERABLE SOVIET INFLUENCE.4

LITTLE OF WHAT CEAUSESCU SAID IN LISBON WILL SIT WELL WITH THE KREMLIN. HIS COMMENTS TO HIS PORTUGUESE HOSTS, PARTICULARLY REGARDING THE COOPERATION OF ALL POLITICAL PARTIES--COMMUNIST,

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WORKERS PARTIES THE OPPORTUNITY "TO RID THEMSELVES
OF THE PAST WITH REGARD TO THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS."
HE ALSO SAID THAT EACH PARTY MUST BE FREE TO DRAW
ITS OWN CONCLUSIONS FROM THE VARIETY OF OPINIONS
THE EUROPEAN PARTY LEADERS WILL OFFER IN THEIR
SPEECHES. GRILCKOV STRESSED THAT THE LEADERS OF EACH
PARTY MUST APPROVE THE DRAFT OF THE FINAL DOCUMENT
BEFORE THE CONFERENCE IS HELD AND THAT ALTERATIONS
MUST NOT BE MADE AT THE CONFERENCE ITSELF.4

THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE AVOIDED TAKING THE LEAD IN
COUNTERING EASTERN PROPAGANDA PRAISING THE PROGRESS
ACHIEVED AT THE LAST DRAFTING SESSION. THIS IS
BELGRADE'S FIRST OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ON THE PRE-
PARATORY MEETING, WHICH ADJOURNED ON OCTOBER 10. IT
CLOSELY PARALLELS A RECENT PRESS STATEMENT FROM THE
INDEPENDENT ITALIAN COMMUNISTS. {CONFIDENTIAL}4

B.ROMAINA: CEAUSESCU'S OPENING SPEECH TO THE CONGRESS OF
THE UNION OF COMMUNIST YOUTH NEXT MONDAY WILL ALMOST

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CERTAINLY REAFFIRM HIS UNSWERVING COMMITMENT TO INTERNAL ORTHODOXY AND TO A STRONGLY NATIONAL COMMUNIST PATH IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THIS IS THE FIRST YOUTH CONGRESS SINCE CEAU-
 Sescu's scathing criticism of the youth organization for its "intellectualism," "bureaucratism," and "neglect of working youth" in July 1971. At that time, Ceausescu stressed a campaign calling for ideological orthodoxy in an effort to reassure Moscow of Bucharest's loyalty. His visit to Peking had led the Soviets and their loyalist allies to charge that an anti-Soviet, pro-Peking axis existed in the Balkans.

Ion Stefanescu, who became first secretary of the youth organization in 1972, responded to Ceausescu's 1971 criticism by emphasizing the increased emphasis the organization was placing on ideology and party policy. Members of the union now participate in regular annual "study courses" and have pressed

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SOCIALIST, AND EVEN "THOSE SECTIONS OF THE BOURGEOISIE THAT WISH TO SERVE THE HOMELAND"--ARE DOCTRINAL HERESY OF THE FIRST ORDER. MOREOVER, THEY CLASH DIRECTLY WITH THE RECENT ZARODOV ARTICLE IN PRAVDA CONDEMNING THOSE COMMUNIST LEADERS WHO DILUTE REVOLUTIONARY ZEAL BY COOPERATING WITH NON-COMMUNISTS. CEAUSESCU ALSO REAFFIRMED ROMANIA'S STRONG DEVOTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF INDEPENDENCE AND OPPOSITION TO EVERY FORM OF INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHERS.4

ADDITIONALLY, IN HIS TOAST TO PRIME MINISTER AZEVEDO, CEAUSESCU PRAISED THE ROMANIAN-PORTUGUESE FRIENDSHIP TREATY OF LAST JUNE, THE FIRST BETWEEN NATO AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, AND DREW A PARALLEL BETWEEN LISBON'S PROBLEMS AND THOSE THAT ONCE CONFRONTED BUCHAREST. ROMANIA, HE SAID, SOLVED THESE DIFFICULTIES SOLELY IN CONFORMITY WITH ITS OWN CONDITIONS.44

CEAUSESCU'S VISIT AND THE ARRAY OF POWERFUL LEADERS TRAVELING WITH HIM SUGGEST THAT HE FACES NO SERIOUS PROBLEMS AT HOME, AS SOME RUMORS HAVE CLAIMED. MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION INCLUDE STEFAN ANDREI, PARTY SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN RELATIONS; FOREIGN MINISTER

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MACOVESCU; NICOLAI DORCARU, PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER ON SECURITY AFFAIRS; DEPUTY PREMIER DRAGANESCU; AND ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF COLONEL-GENERAL ION COMAN. {SECRET}4

4. USSR-VIETNAM: THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED ON FRIDAY AT THE END OF NORTH VIETNAMESE PARTY CHIEF LE DUAN'S OFFICIAL VISIT TO MOSCOW INDICATES THAT HANOI HAS RECEIVED SOME OF THE ECONOMIC AID IT WAS SEEKING AND THAT MOSCOW OBTAINED A NORTH VIETNAMESE ENDORSEMENT OF SOME OF THE USSR'S MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY THEMES.4

LE DUAN, FOR EXAMPLE, PROVED WILLING TO ENDORSE SOVIET DETENTE POLICIES MORE EXPLICITLY THAN HANOI HAS BEFORE. THE SOVIETS FIND THIS ESPECIALLY WELCOME IN LIGHT OF PEKING'S EFFORTS DURING LE DUAN'S VISIT TO CHINA LAST MONTH TO PERSUADE HIM OF THE DANGERS OF DETENTE.4

THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PARTY CHIEF PRAISED THE RESULTS OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE AND EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE KREMLIN'S LINE TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST, PORTUGAL, AND CHILE, ALL OF WHICH ARE POINTS OF CONTENTION IN THE SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY.4

IN THE DECLARATION, HANOI AND MOSCOW WERE RELATIVELY NONCOMMITTAL TOWARD PHNOM PENH, WHERE THE CHINESE INFLUENCE IS PREDOMINANT.

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THIS STANCE CONTRASTED SHARPLY WITH PLEDGES OF AID AND SUPPORT FOR THE PRO-HANOI REGIME IN LAOS.

LIKE THE CHINESE, THE SOVIETS WILL PROVIDE CREDIT ON EASY TERMS INDICATING THAT THE DAYS OF GRANT AID FOR HANOI ARE OVER. MOSCOW WENT A STEP FURTHER THAN PEKING, HOWEVER, BY PROMISING TO DISCUSS SUPPORT FOR NORTH VIETNAM'S SECOND FIVE-YEAR PLAN.

IN ANOTHER GESTURE MOSCOW WILL FIND TO ITS LIKING, HANOI AGREED TO DEVELOP ECONOMIC TIES "WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE MULTI-LATERAL COOPERATION OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES." ALTHOUGH THIS MAY FORESHADOW A CLOSER NORTH VIETNAMESE RELATIONSHIP WITH CEMA, THE VAGUE FORMULATION EMPLOYED ALLOWS FOR CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY.

{CONFIDENTIAL}

5. EUROPEAN COMMUNIST CONFERENCE: IN A SPEECH ON THURSDAY, ALEKSANDR GRGLICKOV, THE TOP YUGOSLAV NEGOTIATOR AT THE MEETING OF DELEGATES FROM 27 EUROPEAN PARTIES IN EAST BERLIN EARLIER THIS MONTH, DESCRIBED THE PRELIMINARY DRAFT NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION AS A "POSSIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR FURTHER WORK" THAT "COULD INVOLVE" INTO

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AN AGREED TEXT FOR A FINAL DOCUMENT. GRILICKOV,
 ADDED HOWEVER, THAT ALMOST ALL PARTICIPANTS OFFERED
 VERBAL AND WRITTEN PROPOSALS THAT MUST BE CONSIDERED
 IN THE NEXT STAGE OF THE DRAFTING EFFORT. HE HINTED
 THAT THE REVISIONS DIFFERED WIDELY AND SAID THAT
 "NEW JOINT EFFORTS BY ALL PARTIES ARE NEEDED" IN
 ORDER TO PRODUCE THE FINAL DOCUMENT.4

GRILICKOV THEN LISTED DEMANDS THAT PRESUMABLY
 REPRESENT BELGRADE'S OWN POSITION ON THE EXISTING
 DRAFT. HE SAID THE CONFERENCE DOCUMENT MUST CREATE
 THE BROADEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITIES FOR COMMUNISTS
 TO COOPERATE WITH THE OTHER DEMOCRATIC AND PROGRESSIVE
 MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE. IT SHOULD COVER ONLY WHAT THE
 COMMUNIST AND WORKERS PARTIES HAVE IN COMMON, AND
 NOT ARTIFICALLY STRIVE TO RECONCILE DIFFERENCES.4

GRILICKOV ADDED—IN AN APPARENT REFERENCE TO THE
 SOVIET'S PRETENSIONS TO LEADERSHIP IN THE MOVE-
 MENT—THAT THE CONFERENCE OFFERS COMMUNIST AND

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INTO SERVICE TO COMBAT THE SPREAD OF "MYSTICISM"
 (RELIGION). STEFANESCU HAS ALSO CHAMPIONED CEAU-
 SESCU'S HARD-DRIVING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM BY
 ORGANIZING "VOLUNTEER" PATRIOTIC WORK PROGRAMS IN
 AGRICULTURE AND CONSTRUCTION, TO WHICH STUDENTS SAY
 THEY HAVE CONTRIBUTED ALMOST ONE MILLION WORK-DAYS
 SINCE 1972. DESPITE STEFANESCU'S EFFORTS, THE LEADER-
 SHIP IS APPARENTLY STILL DISSATISFIED WITH THE EXTENT
 OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION, AND STEFANESCU HAS RE-
 CENTLY CALLED FOR "RADICAL IMPROVEMENT."

ON BALANCE, THE REGIME HAS LITTLE REASON TO CON-
 sider YOUTH A THREAT TO ROMANIA'S INTERNAL STABILITY
 AND SEEMS SATISFIED WITH STEFANESCU'S STEWARDSHIP.
 HIS AMBITIOUS PROGRAM HAS, HOWEVER, SPARKED RUMBLINGS
 OF DISSATISFACTION FROM WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION.
 LAST YEAR, UNIVERSITY STUDENTS REPORTEDLY CIRCULATED
 A PETITION CALLING FOR LESS "CENTRALISM" AND MORE
 "DEMOCRACY" IN THE GROUP'S ACTIVITIES.

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CEAUSESCU WILL NEVERTHELESS PROBABLY CALL FOR
 INCREASED DISCIPLINE AND COMMITMENT, THUS USING THE
 OCCASION TO DEMONSTRATE ONCE AGAIN TO MOSCOW HIS
 COMMITMENT TO A RIGID INTERNAL ORTHODOXY. NO MAJOR
 PERSONNEL SHIFTS ARE EXPECTED, BUT IT IS RUMORED
 THAT CEAUSESCU'S SON, NICU, MAY BE SHIFTED TO THE
 YOUTH GROUP'S SECRETARIAT TO REPLACE VASILE NICOLCIU,
 WHO HAS HANDLED INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FOR SOME 10
 YEARS. {CONFIDENTIAL} E-2, IMPDET.H

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MIDDLE EAST AFRICA BRIEF 169-75.4

1. SPANISH SAHARA: SPAIN'S NEW SEARCH FOR A UN SOLUTION TO THE SAHARAN PROBLEM WAS BROUGHT ABOUT BY ALGERIA'S STRONG OPPOSITION TO MADRID'S BARGAINING DIRECTLY WITH MOROCCO AND MAURITANIA ON THE ISSUE AND BY MOROCCO'S UNWILLINGNESS TO CALL OFF ITS PLANNED MASS MARCH INTO THE TERRITORY.4

PRINCE JUAN CARLOS' SURPRISE ONE-DAY VISIT TO SPANISH SAHARA ON SUNDAY HAS NOW COMMITTED THE NEW LEADER'S PRESTIGE TO SUPPORT OF UN EFFORTS. MOROCCAN KING HASSAN REMAINS EQUALLY COMMITTED TO GAINING RECOGNITION OF MOROCCO'S TERRITORIAL CLAIMS.4

MADRID PRESUMABLY DECIDED IT HAD LITTLE ALTERNATIVE TO GOING ALONG WITH FURTHER EFFORTS UNDER UN AUSPICES, IN VIEW OF ALGERIA'S DETERMINATION TO RESIST A BILATERAL DEAL BETWEEN SPAIN AND MOROCCO. SUCH A COURSE WOULD, MOREOVER, PROVIDE INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMIZATION FOR A DEMONSTRATION OF RESOLUTENESS BY JUAN CARLOS TO UPHOLD SPAIN'S OBLIGATIONS TOWARD SPANISH SAHARA. THE PRINCE'S TRIP TO THE TERRITORY ALSO DEMONSTRATED HIS SOLIDARITY WITH THE ARMY, WHOSE BACKING HE REALIZES IS ESSENTIAL.4

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THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION PASSED ON SUNDAY CALLS ON SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM TO RESUME CONSULTATIONS WITH THE CONCERNED PARTIES. IT OMITTS ANY REFERENCE TO THE UN TRUSTEESHIP ARRANGEMENT THAT WALDHEIM HAS DISCUSSED WITH SPAIN AND THE NORTH AFRICAN STATES INVOLVED. THE PROPOSAL APPARENTLY CALLED FOR SPANISH WITHDRAWAL EARLY NEXT YEAR AND TEMPORARY UN ADMINISTRATION OF THE TERRITORY.4

IT IS NOT READILY APPARENT WHAT FURTHER INDUCEMENTS WALDHEIM CAN OFFER THE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE TO HEAD OFF A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN MOROCCO, SPAIN, AND ALGERIA. THE SECRETARY GENERAL REPORTEDLY HAD EARLIER THOUGHT THAT MOROCCO WOULD ACQUIESCE IN HIS PROPOSAL PROVIDED THE UN TRUSTEESHIP WERE "MANIPULATED" SO THAT THE TERRITORY WOULD SOON BE TURNED OVER TO RABAT AND NOUAKCHOTT. HASSAN, HOWEVER, MAY FEAR THAT ANY REFERENDUM WOULD REVEAL OVERWHELMING SAHARAN SENTIMENT FOR INDEPENDENCE.4

SPAIN'S ACCEPTANCE OF A UN ROLE LEAVES HASSAN LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO PROCEED WITH THE MARCH. LAST WEEK THE KING SAID THAT THE MARCH WOULD BEGIN AS EARLY AS TOMORROW. HE HAS INVESTED TOO MUCH PERSONAL PRESTIGE TO BACK DOWN EMPTY-HANDED AND IS LIKELY TO BEGIN THE MARCH

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WITHIN A FEW DAYS.//HASSAN'S FAILURE TO ACHIEVE SOME SATISFACTION ON SPANISH SAHARA WOULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE HIS ABILITY TO STAY IN POWER.//4

MOROCCO WILL PROBABLY CLAIM THAT MADRID'S DETERMINATION TO STOP THE MARCH BY FORCE IF NECESSARY, RATHER THAN MOROCCO'S OWN ACTIONS, IS CONTRARY TO SUNDAY'S SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. ONCE MARCHERS CROSS THE BORDER, HOWEVER, THERE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE CLASHES WITH SPANISH FORCES OR ARMED PARTISANS OF THE POLISARIO FRONT, A PRO-INDEPENDENCE SAHARAN GROUP SUPPORTED BY ALGERIA. MOROCCAN TROOPS DEPLOYED IN THE SOUTH ARE LIKELY TO INTERVENE IN THAT EVENT.4

MOROCCO HAS "CATEGORICALLY DENIED" PRESS REPORTS THAT ITS FORCES CROSSED THE BORDER INTO SPANISH SAHARA ON MONDAY AND CLASHED WITH THE POLISARIO FRONT. THE MOROCCAN INFORMATION MINISTER SAID, HOWEVER, THAT HE COULD NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT PRO-MOROCCAN RESIDENTS OF THE TERRITORY MIGHT HAVE "RAISED THE MOROCCAN FLAG" IN SOME AREAS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT MOROCCAN IRREGULARS POSING AS SAHARANS CROSSED THE BORDER TO ESTABLISH A SYMBOLIC PRESENCE AND CLASHED WITH

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A POLISARIO FORCE.4

ALGERIA WILL SUPPORT THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S CALL FOR RESTRAINT. IT WANTS TO RETURN THE SAHARAN PROBLEM TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WHICH IN THE PAST HAS STRONGLY BACKED SELF-DETERMINATION. THE NEW SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION IN FACT POINTEDLY REFERS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S ROLE IN THE SAHARAN QUESTION. {CONFIDENTIAL} E-2 IMPDET.H

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SECRET NOFORN

WESTERN HEMISPHERE BRIEF 169-75.4

3. ARGENTINA: ARGENTINE PRESIDENT MARIA ESTELA PERON WAS HOSPITALIZED ON NOVEMBER 3 WITH GALL BLADDER PROBLEMS. THE PRESIDENTIAL PRESS OFFICE HAS ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE SAYING THAT PERON IS IN A PRIVATE CLINIC FOR OBSERVATION, AND THAT HER CONDITION IS NOT SERIOUS. (UNCLASSIFIED)Y

2.//BRAZIL: THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT IS COMING UNDER GROWING PRESSURE FROM A VARIETY OF FORCES.//Y

//SECURITY OFFICIALS AND MILITARY CONSERVATIVES HAVE BEEN LEANING ON PRESIDENT GEISEL FOR SOME TIME TO END THE LIBERALIZING TREND BEGUN SHORTLY AFTER HE TOOK OFFICE. THEY WERE NOT APPEASED BY HIS STATEMENT ON AUGUST 6 THAT HE DID NOT INTEND TO RETURN BRAZIL TO DEMOCRATIC RULE.//Y

//THEY HAVE, HOWEVER, SEIZED ON HIS CALL FOR VIGILANCE AGAINST SUBVERSION AS AN EXCUSE TO MOVE AGAINST OTHER CRITICS OF THE REGIME. LAST WEEK, THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE ORDERED STATE GOVERNORS TO PREVENT MEETINGS THAT COULD PROVE DISRUPTIVE. THE DIRECTIVE DOES NOT SUBSTANTIALLY ADD TO THE GOVERNMENT'S POWERS, BUT IT DOES GIVE STATE

SECRET NOFORN

OFFICIALS CONSIDERABLE LATITUDE IN THEIR ACTIONS.//Y

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//SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE LEGAL OPPOSITION HAVE BEEN ARRESTED AS PART OF A DRIVE AGAINST COMMUNISM. [REDACTED]

SECURITY OFFICIALS HOPE THE ARRESTS AND THE THREAT OF OTHERS WILL COB OUTSPOKEN OPPOSITION POLITICIANS.//Y

//IN ADDITION TO ILLEGAL ARRESTS, THERE ARE REPORTS OF DEATHS OF POLITICAL PRISONERS AS A RESULT OF TORTURE. STUDENTS AND THE LOCAL PRESS ARE ESPECIALLY UPSET OVER THE RECENT DEATH OF A SAO PAULO NEWSMAN. OFFICIALS SAY HE COMMITTED SUICIDE WHILE IN CUSTODY. ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS ARE A POSSIBLE RESULT.//Y

//THE GOVERNMENT'S RECENT INVITATION TO FOREIGN COMPANIES TO PROSPECT FOR OIL IN BRAZIL HAS PROVOKED SHARP CRITICISM AMONG OTHER GROUPS AS WELL. THE NEW POLICY RUNS COUNTER TO DEEPLY INGRAINED NATIONALIST SENTIMENT AND REVERSES THE PRACTICE OF THE PAST TWO DECADES OF EXCLUDING FOREIGNERS FROM THIS ACTIVITY.//Y

//MANY BRAZILIANS ARE, IN FACT, INCREASINGLY DISENCHANTED WITH THE GEISEL ADMINISTRATION. IN THE TWO YEARS SINCE HE TOOK OFFICE, THE "ECONOMIC MIRACLE" HAS BECOME PART OF HISTORY AS RISING

K1D SECRET NOFORN

PRICES SQUEEZED CONSUMERS AND BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS PROBLEMS CONSTRAINED GROWTH. PROSPERITY WAS ONE OF THE MAIN THINGS THAT MADE MILITARY RULE SUPPORTABLE FOR MANY BRAZILIANS. (SECRET NOFORN)//Y

K1D 3.//VENEZUELA: VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ

TO PURCHASE SIX ITALIAN FRIGATES.

THE
25X1D

//THE RANGE, FIREPOWER, AND ANTI-SUBMARINE ABILITY OF THE FRIGATES WILL SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVE VENEZUELA'S NAVY, WHICH HAS ONLY A LIMITED CAPABILITY EITHER TO DEFEND VENEZUELA OR TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEFENSE OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. (CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN)//Y

4. CHILE: PRESIDENT PINOCHET HAS REPUDIATED CHILE'S CONTROVERSIAL VOTE FOR A UN RESOLUTION DECLARING THAT ZIONISM IS A FORM OF RACISM. BY STATING PUBLICLY THAT HE DID NOT APPROVE OF HIS MISSION'S VOTE, PINOCHET WAS MAKING A FRESH ATTEMPT TO UNDO

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SECRET NOFORN

THE DAMAGE THE VOTE HAD DONE TO HIS COUNTRY'S STANDING AMONG WESTERN NATIONS.¶

CHILEAN SUPPORT FOR THE ARAB-BACKED RESOLUTION HAS BROUGHT ALLEGATIONS THAT THE VOTE WAS AN EFFORT TO GAIN ARAB SUPPORT FOR TOMBING DOWN A UN STATEMENT CONDEMNING HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES IN CHILE. ALTHOUGH CHILE'S COURTSHIP OF THE ARABS HAS NETTED NOTHING SO FAR, SOME OF PINOCHET'S ADVISERS EVIDENTLY THOUGHT THE UN VOTE WOULD ELICIT ARAB GOOD WILL PRIOR TO FINANCE MINISTER CAUAS' TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST.¶

THE DECISION TO ABSTAIN IN THE NEXT VOTE ON THIS ISSUE WILL CANCEL OUT ANY LEVERAGE WITH THE ARABS CHILE GAINED BY SIDING WITH THEM EARLIER.¶

MOST CHILEAN DIPLOMATS, HOWEVER, RECOGNIZE THE FOLLY OF FURTHER ALIENATING THE WEST IN RETURN FOR SLENDER EXPECTATIONS OF SUPPORT ELSEWHERE. SINCE CHILE CAST ITS VOTE ON OCTOBER 17, CHILEANS HAVE BEEN STUNG BY PRESS REPORTS THAT THE US MAY SUSPEND ALL MILITARY AID.¶

CHILEAN JUSTICE MINISTER SCHWEITZER HAS IMPLIED THAT CHILE MAY

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SECRET NOFORN

BE REASSESSING ITS STAND ON HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS. HE TOLD THE PRESS IN WASHINGTON THAT IF THE NEXT OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY WERE HELD IN SANTIAGO, THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT WOULD "ALLOW ALL OAS AGENCIES TO SEE FOR THEMSELVES THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN CHILE."
{CONFIDENTIAL} E-2 IMPDET.H

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TO: EAST ASIA BRIEF 169-75.4

1. USSR-VIETNAM: THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED ON FRIDAY AT THE END OF NORTH VIETNAMESE PARTY CHIEF LE DUAN'S OFFICIAL VISIT TO MOSCOW INDICATES THAT HANOI HAS RECEIVED SOME OF THE ECONOMIC AID IT WAS SEEKING AND THAT MOSCOW OBTAINED A NORTH VIETNAMESE ENDORSEMENT OF SOME OF THE USSR'S MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY THEMES.4

LE DUAN, FOR EXAMPLE, PROVED WILLING TO ENDORSE SOVIET DETENTE POLICIES MORE EXPLICITLY THAN HANOI HAS BEFORE. THE SOVIETS FIND THIS ESPECIALLY WELCOME IN LIGHT OF PEKING'S EFFORTS DURING LE DUAN'S VISIT TO CHINA LAST MONTH TO PERSUADE HIM OF THE DANGERS OF DETENTE.

THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PARTY CHIEF PRAISED THE RESULTS OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE AND EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE KREMLIN'S LINE TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST. PORTUGAL, AND CHILE, ALL OF WHICH ARE POINTS OF CONTENTION IN THE SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY.4

IN THE DECLARATION, HANOI AND MOSCOW WERE RELATIVELY NONCOMMITTAL TOWARD PHNOM PENH, WHERE CHINESE INFLUENCE IS PREDOMINANT. THIS STANCE CONTRASTED SHARPLY WITH PLEDGES OF AID AND SUPPORT FOR THE PRO-HANOI REGIME IN LAOS.4

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LIKE THE CHINESE, THE SOVIETS WILL PROVIDE CREDIT ON EASY TERMS, INDICATING THAT THE DAYS OF GRANT AID FOR HANOI ARE OVER. MOSCOW WENT A STEP FURTHER THAN PEKING, HOWEVER, BY PROMISING TO DISCUSS SUPPORT FOR NORTH VIETNAM'S SECOND FIVE-YEAR PLAN.4

IN ANOTHER GESTURE MOSCOW WILL FIND TO ITS LIKING, HANOI AGREED TO DEVELOP ECONOMIC TIES "WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE MULTILATERAL COOPERATION OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES." ALTHOUGH THIS MAY FORESHADOW A CLOSER NORTH VIETNAMESE RELATIONSHIP WITH CEMA, THE VAGUE FORMULATION EMPLOYED ALLOWS FOR CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY. {CONFIDENTIAL}4

2. CHINA-INDIA: A CHINESE SPOKESMAN HAS REFUSED TO COMMENT ON THE CLASH ALONG THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER REPORTED SATURDAY BY THE INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY.4

NEW DELHI SAYS THAT ON OCTOBER 20, A ROUTINE PATROL "WELL WITHIN INDIAN TERRITORY" WAS AMBUSHED BY SOME 40 CHINESE TROOPS. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY SAID THE INCIDENT OCCURRED IN ARUNACHAL PRADESH, THE FORMER NORTHWEST FRONTIER AGENCY.4

FOUR MEMBERS OF THE INDIAN PATROL WERE KILLED BUT TWO MANAGED TO ESCAPE, ACCORDING TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. NEW DELHI SAYS THAT THE

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DELAY IN ANNOUNCING THE ATTACK WAS DUE TO A BREAKDOWN IN COMMUNICATIONS NEAR THE BORDER.

CHINESE AND INDIAN TROOPS HAVE CLASHED INFREQUENTLY ALONG THE BORDER SINCE THE BORDER WAR IN 1962. THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNS OF UNUSUAL ACTIVITY IN THE REGION IN RECENT WEEKS. IT IS UNLIKELY THE CLASH WILL LEAD TO SERIOUS FIGHTING. THE WEATHER IN THE HIMALAYAS THIS TIME OF YEAR WOULD IMPEDE THE MOVEMENT OF REINFORCEMENTS AND SUPPLIES FOR BOTH SIDES. {SECRET} E-2, IMPDET.H

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